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Abstract
It is well-known that subjects in bilateral bargaining experiments often
exhibit choice behavior suggesting there are strong reciprocators in the
population. But it is controversial whether explaining this data requires a
social preference model that invokes genuine strong reciprocity or whether
some social preference model built on other-regarding preferences as a
surrogate can explain it. Since the data precedes theory here, all the social
preference models agree on most of it — making direct tests more difficult.
We report results from a laboratory experiment using a novel method for
testing between the classes of social preference models in the trust game
that manipulates the distribution of payoff information in the game. We
find evidence supporting the strong reciprocity hypothesis.
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1 Introduction
It is a robust and well-known fact that subjects in bilateral bargaining experi-
ments manage to reach off-equilibrium cooperative distributions. Something
that stands most in need of explanation is choice behavior consistent with
strong reciprocity.
Consider, as an example, the investment game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe,
1995). Here Player i has some endowment Mi. Player 1 can invest any of that
(X) at a growth rate r ; Player 2 then decides a distribution of rX between
them. Subjects playing this game anonymously in a one-shot environment
under double-blind conditions still manage to reach distributions that Pareto
dominate the equlibrium. In equilibrium, an investor (Player 1) invests nothing
because he knows that a rational Player 2 would keep all of rX and return
none of it; both players finish with their initial endowments. That is inefficient.
But subjects famously do much better: with equal endowments at $M , first-
movers invest on average half of their endowment and second-movers, on
average, return slightly more than the amount invested (Berg, Dickhaut, and
McCabe, 1995; Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing, 2000; Casari and Cason, 2008).
It is this second-mover behavior that suggests significant numbers of strong
reciprocators in our midst.
What is true in the investment game is — again, famously — true for a wide
class of bilateral bargaining games: contracting games (Rigdon, 2008), ultima-
tum games (Güth, Schmitteberger and Schwarze, 1982; Houser and Xiao, 2003;
Oosterbeek, Sloof, and van de Kuilen, 2004), mini-ultimatum games (Falk, Fehr,
and Fischbacher, 2003), and binary-choice trust games (McCabe, Rigdon, and
Smith, 2002; Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004). In each case, of course, there are
interesting boundary conditions and open emprical questions. But the broad
result is impressive: a substantial portion of the population reveal social pref-
erences in choice behavior. They care about, though perhaps not only about,
the payoffs of relevant agents in the decision making environment.1
Just how they care about those payoffs is an open question. There are
two broad classes of social preference models that answer the question in
different ways. The first are models of strong reciprocity. Agents might care
about the payoffs of others depending on the actions of those agents: they
might value the payoffs negatively — and hence want ceteris paribus to see
1For an overview of some of the relevant recent literature on social preferences see Fehr and
Fischbacher (2005).
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them reduced — if they view the actions as hostile or desrving of retribution;
they might value them positively — and hence want ceteris paribus to see them
increased — if they view the actions as kind or deserving of approbation. Key to
this way of trying to capture the data is that how agents see the motives and
intentions of others is relevant to deciding what they themselves should do.
Those agents are strong reciprocators, and models that aim at capturing this
directly are models of strong reciprocity.2
But models of strong reciprocity are only one way of trying to explain this
choice behavior. Other social preference models might just as well explain the
observed choice behavior consistent with strong reciprocity without appeal to
strong reciprocity at all. If so, then there is no empirical reason to think that
there are strongly reciprocal types in the population at all and thus no empirical
reason to favor models that truck in reciprocity talk. For instance, agents
might care about the payoffs of others just because they are — conditionally or
unconditionally — altruistic. This altrusim can take a variety of forms. Perhaps
agents are inequity averse: they don’t much care for unequal splits, but they
might be willing to tolerate some inequality if it favors them (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Or perhaps the relevant segment of the
population simply prefers (ceteris paribus and subject to various constraints
of course) distributions in which the relevant agents (say, their counterpart
under certain conditions) do a bit better to other distributions (Levine, 1998;
Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008). Both kinds of models of altruism share a
common thread: they both attempt to capture the relevant data not by appeal
to strong reciprocity but by some altruism-inspired surrogate. We’ll use the
cover-term “other-regarding preferences” for that surrogate. That is the key
idea for us, so we will largely ignore differences between the ways of doing that.
But, as in a lot of places in behavioral game theory, the data all of these
social preference models are supposed to explain preceded the theory. Thus
all of the theories — whether intentions-based or other-regarding preferences
based — cover pretty much the same data. So novel tests that distinguish the
classes of theories are welcome.
There are differences between the classes of models. One important dif-
ference is that models that try to capture the choice behavior consistent with
strong reciprocity by appeal to some altruistic surrogate assume that prefer-
2Prominent examples of such models include Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004); McCabe
and Smith (2000b); Falk and Fischbacher (2005). For overviews of the landscape, see Smith (2008);
Gintis (2000).
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ences over distributions are separable from the paths through the game tree
that determine those distributions. The preferences are defined over bundles
and those definitions are insensitive to the presence or absence of alternative
bundles. That is not true for (direct) models of strong reciprocity since the
whole point in that case is to make preferences sensitive in just that way. This
asymmetry makes modeling strong reciprocity much harder. But it is also
a difference that has been exploited in the laboratory to test the classes of
models — by varying alternative distibutions avalilable, we can get direct tests
of the theories (McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith, 2003; Charness and Rabin, 2002;
Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2003; Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov, 2006).
We report results of a laboratory experiment that exploits a novel way of
distinguishing between classes of social preference models that does not de-
pend on manipulating either the possible distributions available or the paths
traversed through the game tree to arrive at those distributions. We focus — for
simplicity — on binary-choice trust games, and in particular on second-mover
behavior in those games. Rather than asking about alternative paths through the
game tree, we instead ask about how varying the way information is distributed
about the game affects social preference models. We show that different classes
of models treat information about the material payoffs in different ways, and
this difference implies differences in predictions across our treatments in
different places. Our main result is that the observed choice behavior is com-
patible with strong reciprocity models but not the other-regarding preference
surrogates. This is evidence in favor of the strong reciprocity hypothesis: op-
portunists and altruists do not exhaust the population; there are also genuine
strong reciprocators.
2 Epistemic Conditions
It is common to think that there is a strong connection between what is common
knowledge and the pure strategy equilibria in two-person non-cooperative
games. After all, it is tempting to think that in equilibrium rational Player i
does his part because rational Player j does her part — and j does her part
because i does his. That kind of mutual expectation between i and j does
sound like it should have something to do with common knowledge. But the
truth here, as pointed out by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), is much
simpler: if the players know their own payoffs and the strategy choices of
each other, then rational players’ choices will be a Nash equilibrium. This way











r x2 = ($15,$25)
Figure 1: The $10 Trust Game
of distributing information is far short of common knowledge.3 There is no
similar interesting necessary condition on what information — higher-order or
otherwise — players must have in order for their choices to be in equilibrium.
The reason is simple: players can stumble into equilibrium for no reason in
particular, without anyone knowing much of anything. Still, as Aumann and
Brandenburger emphasize, there is no way to weaken the sufficient conditions
here. It is in that sense that that distribution of information characterizes Nash
equilibrium.
But suppose we care not so much about whole strategy profiles but only
about second-movers’ contribution to those profiles. And suppose we care not
so much about Nash equilibria in classical game theory but about stable points
in social preference amendments in behavioral game theory. There are still
interesting epistemic conditions to be found. Those conditions characterize
who needs to know what about the game in order for the model in question to
explain second-mover behavior. In other words: fix a social preference model.
What distribution of information about the material payoffs in the game is
required for that model to explain second-mover choice behavior? Here is
where we see the social preference models segregating themselves.
We will focus on a trust game with the payoffs as in Figure 1. Suppose x
3This, in fact, is only the preliminary observation that Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)
make. Their two main results are a good deal more general (dealing with mixtures of strategies
interpreted as conjectures) — as with the preliminary observation, common knowledge plays no
role.
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is a terminal node in the tree. Then, where pi(x) is the distribution (vector of
payoffs) determined by terminal node x, let pii(x) be i’s share of that.4 Where
n is a non-terminal choice node, let Π— with or without subscripts — give us
the the set of possible distributions reachable from n:
Π(n) = {pi(x) : x is a terminal node that is a descendant of n}
Πi(n) = {pii(x) : x is a terminal node that is a descendant of n}
This bit of notation helps to state who needs to know what, given some model,
to explain observed choice behavior in the trust game that is consistent with
the presence of strong reciprocators.
To see this, let’s label the two choice nodes in the simple trust game. Let’s
call the first, controlled by Player 1, n1 and the second, controlled by Player 2, n2.
Π(n1) is the set of all three distributions possible in the game, Π(n2) is the set
of distributions that Player 2 has to choose between. What we now want to do is
consider three ways of distributing information about this game between Player
1 and Player 2. In particular, we look at three ways of distributing information
about Π(n1) and Π(n2). (There are, of course, other ways of distributing the
information as well. As will become clear, we care about these three ways for a
reason.)
First, information about payoffs may be a matter of private knowledge. That
is, suppose that while the space of actions for Player i is known by Player
−i, the payoffs are merely privately known in the sense that each player only
knows his own share of that distribution: for each terminal node x, Player i
only knows pii(x). Hence, Player 1 only knows Π1(n1) and Player 2 only knows
Π2(n1). This is the private distribution of payoff information.
Second, information about payoffs may be a matter of asymmetric knowl-
edge. Of course, each player knows his own payoff for each terminal node.
What we are interested in here is a distribution of information in which, in
addition, Player 2 knows Player 1’s payoffs and knows that Player 1 does not
know this. That is, for each terminal node x, Player 2 knows pi1(x) and knows
that this fact is something Player 1 does not know. Under this distribution of
4Technically it is a bit better to first label the terminal nodes x1, . . . , xn and take pi(xi) to
be a vector of ordered pairs (xi,mj) where mj is player j’s share of the monetary payoff at
xi— that way we can always recover an association between a player’s payoff and the node, and
hence the path through the game tree, that yields that payoff. For simplicity, we suppress that
detail here. When no confusion will arise, we omit reference to the terminal node and write pii.
Similarly, when convenient and when no confusion will result we simply identify terminal nodes
with the distributions they determine.
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information, Player 1 still only knows Π1(n1) but Player 2 now knows quite a
bit more: (i) she knows Π(n1) and (ii) she knows that Player 1 does not know (i).
This is the asymmetric distribution of payoff information.
Third, information about payoffs may be a matter of common knowledge.
This represents the standard assumption, and what usually gets operationalized
in laboratory settings by reading the instructions aloud.5 Under this distribu-
tion, for each terminal x, each player knows the entire distribution pi(x), each
knows that each knows this, and so on. Here Π(n1) is common information.6
This is the common distribution of payoff information.
Different models of Player 2 behavior treat different levels of payoff infor-
mation in the trust game as relevant in explaining observed choice behavior
that is consistent with strong reciprocity. Those differences are the minimal
epistemic conditions for the respective models, and what we use to differentiate
the theories.
Let us start, to illustrate, with the homo economicus model. This model
says that Player 2’s utility (like that of all agents) at terminal node x, U2(x),
is identical to her material payoff at x and that Player 2 seeks to maximize
her utility and thus her own payoff. And consider the private distribution of
information under which Player 2 only knows, for each terminal node, her own
payoff at that node. A self-interested Player 2 has no trouble seeing what to do:
she maximizes, and we already know that she doesn’t need to know anything
about Π1(n1) to do that. All she needs is to know Π2(n2). Everything else is
irrelevant. So, since pi2(x3) = 40 > pi2(x2) = 25, this model predicts that Player
2’s choose the opportunistic D.
We can get this tight an explanation from the homo economicus model from
modest means: Player 2 needs to know Π2(n1) but nothing more. Anything
less, of course, and we lose the prediction. Thus:
Observation (Homo Economicus). The minimal epistemic condition (about
material payoffs) for Player 2 choice behavior in the homo economicus model is
that Player 2 know Π2(n2).
We got that explanation without Player 2 knowing anything but her own pay-
5Public announcements are often, though not aways, a good way of making something
common knowledge.
6Note that these three distributions do not form a tidy hierarchy in the sense that we only
add to the knowledge of the agents as we add information: in particular, it is false that if Player
2 knows that p under the common distribution then she knows that p under the asymmetric
distribution. That is because one of the things she knows in that latter case is that Player 1 does
not know that Player 2 knows pi1. But Player 1 does know that in the former case.
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off information in the bottom of the tree. That is the characteristic information
for that explanation. Thus all the other higher-order information under the
asymmetric and common information distributions is irrelevant to explaining
Player 2 behavior given this model. Explaining her behavior, given this model,
doesn’t depend in any way on that information.
We can ask the same kinds of questions of social preference models. What
we will see is that while they all allow for differences in choice behavior between
our distributions of information, they predict those differences in different
spots. Since our interest is not in particular theories but in the broad classes
they represent, we will leave the discussion as informal as possible and just
state the stylized trends that the theories predict.
The first thing to notice is that, for our purposes, there is no interesting
difference between unconditional and conditional altruism models. Both models
try to explain behavior consistent with strong reciprocity by appeal to some
surrogate that allows U2(x), Player 2’s utility at terminal node x, to be affected
by some property of pi(x). The models differ on what that property is, and
how it can and cannot affect U2(x); but those are family squabbles.
What is significant is that all such other-regarding preference models share
a common characterizing epistemic condition. All such models say that Player
2 will act so as to maximize her utility, picking whichever of U2(x2) and U2(x3)
is greater. But what information does she need to do that in the simple trust
game? She clearly must know what she can earn in the two distributions she has
to choose from so she must know Π2(n2). But since these are other-regarding
preference models and her utility for each distribution is also a function of
what Player 1 gets at that distribution, she must also know Π1(n2). So she must
know Π(n2). In terms of what Player 2 needs to know about Π, that is it. As
far as payoffs are concerned, U2(x2) and U2(x3) are only a function of Π(n2).
In particular, it is manifestly not a function of what Player 1 knows about what
Player 2 knows about Π(n2) or Π(n1).7
Consider as an example a simple form of an inequity aversion model (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999). Here, Player 2’s utility at x U2(x) is pi2(x) decremented
by how much she dislikes inequality that favors Player 1 (if the distribution x
determines does favor Player 1) or by how much she dislikes inequality in her
7Some have argued — see, e.g., Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008) — that there is room for
other-regarding preference models that require Player 2 to know something of Π(n1) in order to
figure U2(x2). For our purposes, we can remain agnostic on that question since even if that were
true our main point is unaffected: U2 still wouldn’t depend on what Player 1 knows about what
Player 2 knows about Π(n1).
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favor (if x does favor Player 2):
U2(x) =
pi2(x)−α2(pi1(x)−pi2(x)) if pi1 > pi2pi2(x)− β2(pi2(x)−pi1(x)) otherwise
The weights are constrained so that β2 ≤ α2 and 0 ≤ β2 < 1. The thing to notice
is that no matter what values α2 and β2 take, what this requires is that Player
2 know the material payoffs of the whole distribution pi(x) and for her to
sensibly compare such weighted utilities, she must know — in the simple trust
game —Π(n2). It does not require her to know anything about what Player 1
knows, and in particular it does not require her to know what Player 1 knows
about what Player 2 knows about pi(x) or, in the case we are interested in,
about what Player 1 knows about what Player 2 knows about Π(n2). And if she
does have this information, there is no place the model can put it to use; it is
just not relevant. This is an example, but the reasoning holds good for the class
of other-regarding preference models.
Observation (Other-Regarding Preference Models). The minimal epistemic con-
dition (about material payoffs) for Player 2 choice behavior in other-regarding
preference models is that Player 2 know Π(n2).
So the minimal epistemic condition for an other-regarding preference model
to explain Player 2 choice behavior is simple: Player 2 must know the details
of Π(n2). Thus any payoff information beyond this is redundant from the
point of view of other-regarding preference models and thus irrelevant to any
explanation of Player 2 choice behavior such models might have on offer.
Things are different for direct models of strong reciprocity. The idea behind
these models is that behavior in bargaining environments like the simple trust
game are like the execution of an implicit incomplete contract. Player 2 only
has a choice if Player 1 passes on the outside option; Player 2 reasons that
Player 1 would only do that, trusting her and putting himself at risk — ceteris
paribus of course — if he thought Player 2 would reciprocate. That outcome
Pareto dominates the equilibrium, Player 1 seems to be saying, so let’s do that.
That is the idea behind such models. And while that is clear enough, it is still
hard to make that precise enough to model in a way that is both illuminating
and tractable. (Indeed, this is one reason why other-regarding preference
models are so tempting: since they invoke separability, they are mathematically
simple.) But all ways of making it precise take something like this form for the
trust game: Player 2’s utility at x depends not only on that entire distribution
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pi(x) but also on the path through the tree that got the players to that point.
This is often encoded as a kindness term that measures how kind or trusting
Player 2 thinks Player 1 is.
No matter how these details get spelled out, we can still say something
useful for the whole class of models. What we care about is how these models
work when Player 2 compares her kindness/intentions-adjusted utility for
choosing R with her kindness/intentions-adjusted utility for choosing D. So
in figuring how U2(x3) compares to U2(x2) she needs to weigh how kind or
trusting she figures Player 1 is in choosing d instead of r . Our point here is
simple: Player 2 cannot really attribute any trust to Player 1, and so cannot
be acting so as to execute an implicit incomplete contract to get to the Pareto
dominant distribution, unless the terms of that contract — that is, Π(n1)— are
common information between them (or, at least, a good enough approximation
thereof). The reason is just that in order to have a contract, both parties need
to know what is at stake and what is at risk. You cannot, in the ideal case, have
a contract between parties in which the terms to the contract are not a matter
of common information between the parties. That just isn’t a contract.
Observation (Strong Reciprocity Models). The minimal epistemic condition
(about material payoffs) for Player 2 choice behavior in (intentionality-based)
strong reciprocity models is that Π(n1) is common information.
Obviously, since common knowledge can be hard to come by, these models
do not assume that agents always have that. But they do say that the closer
Player 2 comes to having good enough grounds for thinking that the details of
Π(n1) is some good enough approximation of common knowledge, the more
likely she will take Player 1’s off-equilibrium behavior to be trusting behavior.
Whether or not she feels much like reciprocating is a further question.
3 Design and Predictions
Our laboratory experiment simply systematically varies the distributions of
payoff information in the simple trust game. That gives us three treatments:
• PRIVATE: Each Player i only knows Πi(n1); that is, i only knows i’s share
of the distribution at each terminal node (the private distribution)
• ASYMMETRIC: Player 1 only knows Π1(n1); Player 2 knows Π(n1) and
knows that Player 1 does not know this (the asymmetric distribution)
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• COMMON: Π(n1) is a matter of common knowledge between the players
(the common distribution)
Each of these corresponds to the the epistemic conditions of our three broad
classes of models (homo economicus, other-regarding preferences, and strong
reciprocity). Putting the two together then gives three stylistic predictions about
comparative cooperation rates by Player 2s in the population. We illustrate
those predictions here, noting that the predictions do not depend on any
particular model within a given class or on any particular parameterization of
any particular model with a given class. The predictions are, in this sense, fully
general.
For each class of models, the basic reasoning to get predicted cooperation
rates is straightforward. Suppose a given class of models has E as a charac-
terizing epistemic condition. Then any information about the material payoffs
beyond that is redundant information. Thus if two treatments differ only in
that one provides E and the other provides E plus some payoff information
beyond E, then that class of models predicts Player 2 behavior, and in particular
Player 2 behavior consistent with strong reciptocity, to be constant across those
treatments.8
Take homo economicus. Obviously, we are going to get a very uninteresting
limit case prediction here: no reciprocity in any treatment. That is simply
because, first, the model predicts no cooperation by Player 2 under a private dis-
tribution of payoff information (and so none in PRIVATE) and that distribution
is the minimal information for that model. All the other ways of distributing
information that we care about — in ASYMMETRIC and COMMON— just provide
extra information that the homo economicus model deems irrelevant. So, if that
model were right, we would expect rates of cooperation to remain constant
across private, asymmetric, and common distributions of payoff information.
And, moreover, they should be low. Let Pr(R|X) be the proportion of Player 2s
choosing R conditional on being in treatment X. Then the first prediction is:
Prediction (Homo Economicus).
1. Pr(R| PRIVATE) = Pr(R| ASYMMETRIC) = Pr(R| COMMON)
8To be a little more precise: the correspondence between epistemic conditions and the
models is that homo economicus treats information beyond what Player 2 knows about Π2(n2),
not that beyond Π2(n1), as irrelevant; mutatis mutandis for other-regarding preference models.
In our distributions Player 2 also has some information about the outside option. Still, since
Π(n2) ⊂ Π(n1), this does no harm to the predictions and makes our distributions, and hence
our experimental design, more symmetric.
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2. Pr(R| PRIVATE) is low
Other-regarding preference models, of course, were built to explain behavior
that is consistent with strong reciprocity. They say that Player 2’s behavior
is sensitive to the entire distributions she must choose between, not just her
shares of those distributions. That is, for her to maximize her expected utility
she needs to know Π(n2) not just Π2(n2). In the kind of epistemic situation
in PRIVATE, she lacks some of that crucial information and so we expect low
cooperation. But when she has it — that is, in any kind of epistemic situation
in which her information entails the minimal epistemic condition — we should
expect much higher rates of cooperation. In particular, in ASYMMETRIC, Player
2 knows Π(n1). This straightaway entails that Player 2 knows Π(n2), and so
we should expect more Player 2s opting for R here. The interesting comparison
is whether we should expect even more plays of R by Player 2s in COMMON.
Given this class of models, clearly not: the information under the common
distribution that goes beyond what Player 2 has in the asymmetric distribution
is strictly irrelevant, given an other-regarding preference model, to the adjusted
utilities U2(x2) and U2(x3). Since that extra information is choice-irrelevant, it
ought not make a difference. This second prediction can then be put this way:
Prediction (Other-regarding Preferences).
1. Pr(R| PRIVATE) < Pr(R| ASYMMETRIC)
2. Pr(R| ASYMMETRIC) = Pr(R| COMMON)
And, finally, let’s look at intentions-based models of strong reciprocity.
Assuming some model in this class, the private and asymmetric distributions
of payoff information are not sufficient epistemic conditions for robust trust
by Player 1 and so not sufficient for strong reciprocity by Player 2. Still, no
one thinks all Player 2s are strong reciprocators — some are opportunists,
some altruists. In PRIVATE, opportunists have all the information they need
but there is no chance for altruism, except by dumb luck. So we should
expect very few Player 2s opting for R. What about in the richer epistemic
situation in ASYMMETRIC? Under the asymmetric distribution, notice, there
is enough information for the altruists in the population to act accordingly:
once they know Π(n2) they can opt for R in non-random ways. But the strong
reciprocity hypothesis is that the altruists and opportunists do not exhaust
the population. So although we would expect more cooperation under the
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Figure 2: Stylized Predictions: Rates of Cooperation by Player 2
asymmetric distribution, we should expect even more still when we move from
ASYMMETRIC to COMMON. According to models in this class, only the common
distribution provides payoff information that is sufficient for the execution of
an implicit contract between the agents.
Prediction (Strong Reciprocity).
1. Pr(R| PRIVATE) < Pr(R| ASYMMETRIC)
2. Pr(R| ASYMMETRIC) < Pr(R| COMMON)
Different social preference models require Player 2 to have different infor-
mation about the possible distributions in order to explain off-equilibrium
behavior. What we have seen is that this can be exploited — even without con-
sidering any particular model — to segregate the classes of models in virtue of
their emprical commitments. These stylized predictions are summarized in
Figure 2.
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4 Experimental Procedures
All sessions were run in the Robert Zajonc’s Laboratory at the University of
Michigan’s Institute for Social Research.9 The sessions were run December 2007
through February 2008. The subjects played the trust game once and only once,
and this fact was common information.10 Subjects were randomly assigned
to the role of Player 1 or Player 2. Player 1s and Player 2s were kept separate
for the entire experiment using two rooms. Once an even number of subjects
had arrived, instructions were handed out, and then read aloud. Subjects were
allowed to ask questions individually. When there were no additional questions,
the experiment began. All subjects received a large envelope which contained
two smaller envelopes: one had the decision sheet and the other had a short
demographic survey to be completed after all subjects had made their decisions.
Subjects were asked to remove the decision sheet, record their move of right
or down with an arrow, place the sheet back in the envelope, and drop the
contents in a box at the back of the lab.
The trust game was implemented using the strategy method. Player 2s are
asked to assume that Player 1 has selected down and make their choice of right
or down accordingly. This method allows observation of behavior by all Player
2s regardless of whether Player 1s choose d.11
Most sessions had 20 subjects and took less than 1 hour to complete. Each
subject received $5 for showing up on time. Average earnings (excluding the
show-up payment) were $9.17 for Player 1s and $17.20 for Player 2s, and varied
from $0 to $40.
The only difference in the instructions for the treatment conditions was
in the description of the information available to the players about potential
payoffs. In PRIVATE, instructions for Player i show question marks that obscure
the payoffs for Player −i at terminal nodes and explain that these question
marks hide the other player’s payoff. In ASYMMETRIC, instructions for Player
1 are as in PRIVATE; Player 2 sees the full unobscured game tree and also
sees the game tree and discussion as it appears in Player 1’s instructions. In
COMMON, there are no obscuring question marks. Subjects also completed a
post-instruction quiz that was checked for accuracy: Player 1 had to demon-
9Data are avalable from the authors at request.
10Subjects who had participated in similar experiments were excluded from recruitment.
11Some evidence exists that trust games implemented in this manner generate differences
in behavior (McCabe, Smith, and LePore, 2000; Casari and Cason, 2008; Solnick, 2007). We will
return to this below in Section 6.
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Figure 3: Rates of Cooperation by Players 2
strate an understanding of the relevant information distribution; and Player
2 had to register a prediction about Player 1’s response. Subjects showed no
difficulty with the quiz. At the completion of the experiment, subjects filled
out a short demographic survey.12
5 Main Results
Our main result is that Player 2s choose R at low levels in PRIVATE, at medium
levels in ASYMMETRIC, and at high levels only in COMMON. These differences
are incompatible with the stylized predicitions of the homo economicus model
and other-regarding preference models, but consistent with the predictions of
strong reciprocity models. We present this main result in three different ways:
Figure 3 plots the data against the predictions of the classes of models, Table 1
reports statistical tests, and Table 2 reports regression results.
The predictions we summarized in Figure 2 say what we should expect,
given a type of model, as we add to the payoff information Player 2s have. The
homo economicus model says we should expect “low”, and invariant, rates of
cooperative play by Player 2s across the treatments. Other-regarding preference
12The quiz and survey are available from the authors upon request.
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models say we should expect low levels in PRIVATE, but high (and identical)
proportions of Player 2s choosing R in both ASYMMETRIC and COMMON. The
strong reciprocity hypothesis is that altruists (conditional or otherwise) do
not exhaust the population of cooperative types. So models of strong reci-
procity want to predict an increase for each stage as we move from PRIVATE to
ASYMMETRIC to COMMON. Assume that, in this context, “low” correspond to
rates below 5%, “moderate” to rates in the 20%− 25% range, and “high” to rates
above 45%. Then we can graph the mean rates of observed cooperative play by
Player 2s in our treatments and lay this on top of the qualitative predictions
in Figure 2 to get Figure 3. And doing that — even before conducting more
statistical tests — makes it pretty clear that neither homo economicus models
nor other-regarding preference models can cover the data.
Table 1 reports the number of Player 2s who choose off-equilibrium path
cooperation (R), the number of pairs ending up at the cooperative outcome
(x2), and the number of observations for each treatment. The rate of R-play in
PRIVATE is statistically lower than in ASYMMETRIC (p-value= 0.0236).13 This
is evidence against any model — in particular, against the homo economicus
model — that predicts that Pr(R|PRIVATE) = Pr(R|ASYMMETRIC). The data
instead conform to what we would expect given an other-regarding preference
model or a strong reciprocity model. The rate of R-play in ASYMMETRIC is
statistically lower than in COMMON (p-value= 0.0124). This is evidence against
any model that predicts — as other-regarding preference models do — that
Pr(R|ASYMMETRIC) = Pr(R|COMMON). The data instead conform to what we
would expect given a strong reciprocity model. That is, compatible with the
strong reciprocity hypothesis, we see evidence that Pr(R|PRIVATE) is lower than
Pr(R|ASYMMETRIC) and that Pr(R|ASYMMETRIC) is lower than Pr(R|COMMON).
This is confirmed by logitistic regression analysis. All of the relevant predic-
tions from the social preference models are pairwise predictions, comparing
Player 2 cooperation between PRIVATE and ASYMMETRIC and comparing Player
2 cooperation between ASYMMETRIC and COMMON. So, similarly, we want to
compare data in this pairwise way, estimating the following simple model:
Coop = β× Treatment
13The results reported here are based on difference in proportion tests, unless otherwise
noted.
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Cooperation Rates By Treatment
PRIVATE ASYMMETRIC COMMON
P2s Choosing R (%) 3.33 22.00 46.51
Pairs Reaching x2 (%) 3.33 8.00 32.56
# of Pairs 30 50 43
Difference in Proportions Tests
Pr(R|PRIV) Pr(R|ASYM) Pr(R|ASYM) Pr(R|COMM)
P2s Choosing R Yes∗ Yes∗∗
Pairs Reaching x2 No Yes∗∗∗
p-values: ∗ ≤ 0.05, ∗∗ ≤ .01, ∗∗∗ ≤ .001
Table 1: Cooperation Rates
where
Coop =
1 if Player 2 chose R0 otherwise
We estimate the above regression twice: once when making the pairwise com-
parison between Pr(R|PRIVATE) and Pr(R|ASYMMETRIC). In that case we set
Treatment = ASYMMETRIC and drop data from COMMON. And we estimate it
again when making the pairwise comparison between Pr(R|ASYMMETRIC) and
Pr(R|COMMON). In that case we set Treatment = COMMON and drop data from
PRIVATE.







pseudo R2 0.0913 .0532
std. errors in parentheses; p-values: ∗ ≤ 0.05, ∗∗ ≤ .01, ∗∗∗ ≤ .001
Table 2: Player 2 Cooperation Pairwise Logits
The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 2. The first column re-
ports that the estimation of the net odds of R play by a Player 2 in ASYMMETRIC
are about 12% greater than those under PRIVATE. This is evidence against any
model that predicts constant cooperation rates between PRIVATE and ASYMMET-
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RIC. The second column reports that the estimation of the net odds of R play
by a Player 2 in COMMON are about 32% greater than those under ASYMMETRIC.
This is evidence against any model — and so against the class of other-regarding
preference models — that predicts constant cooperation rates between ASYM-
METRIC and COMMON. The strong reciprocity hypothesis is compatible with
both odds estimates. To summarize:
Result (Strong Reciprocity).
1. Player 2 observed behavior satisfies both inequalities predicted by strong
reciprocity models:
a) Pr(R|PRIVATE) < Pr(R|ASYMMETRIC)
b) Pr(R|ASYMMETRIC) < Pr(R|COMMON)
2. Moreover, the cooperation rates are low in PRIVATE, moderate in ASYM-
METRIC, and high only in COMMON
This is strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis that opportunists and altruists
do not exhaust the population; there are also strong reciprocators.
6 Other Results
Our main result raises some additional issues that are, strictly speaking, inde-
pendent of the main question we have been pursuing. One issue is that it looks
like payoff privacy encourages competitive, equlibrium-path play. Another
issue is that our experiment used the strategy method to elicit choices while
most other trust game experiments use the game method — is choice behavior
in trust games sensitive to elicitation method? In this section we briefly discuss
some additional results from a second set of treatments aimed at probing these
issues further.
We added two additional treatments to our design:
• PRIVATE-GAME: Distribution of payoff information as in PRIVATE, but
Player 2 offers a choice at a node n2 only if, and only after being informed
that, Player 1 chose d
• COMMON-GAME: Distribution of payoff information as in COMMON, but
Player 2 offers a choice at a node n2 only if, and only after being informed
that, Player 1 chose d
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(b) COMMON-GAME (N = 50)
p-value: ∗∗ ≤ 0.01
Figure 4: Game Method Results
Figure 4 reports the basic results from these two additional treatments. The
first thing to notice is that in PRIVATE-GAME there is little trust by Player 1s:
only 1545 Player 2s (33.33%) even get a chance to choose; all others are funneled
to the inefficient subgame perfect distribution (Figure 4a). This is in contrast
to COMMON-GAME, in which 2150 Player 2s (42%) have a chance to determine the
gains from exchange (Figure 4b). This difference in rates of trusting d play is
significant (p-value 0.011). Similarly, Player 2s choose R in only 315 cases (20%)
in PRIVATE-GAME while in COMMON-GAME 1421 Player 2s (66.67%) choose R. This
difference is significant (p-value: 0.0057). These results are broadly consistent
with those reported by McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith (1998) who find that payoff
privacy in their trust/punishment “Game 1” funnels subjects into subgame
perfect, but sub-optimal, distributions.14
Result (Payoff Privacy). Cooperative choice behavior of Player 1s and Player 2s
in COMMON-GAME resemble known results for binary-choice trust games. In
PRIVATE-GAME both Player 1s and Player 2s are far more likely to play on the
equilibrium path.
We began the paper by noting that, despite the temptation to think otherwise,
14This is also consistent with the early result in Smith (1962): he reports market convergence
where private information of values, even with few traders, is sufficient to drive outcomes to
competitive equilibrium.
Epistemic Conditions and Social Preferences in Trust Games 20
Strategy Method
PRIVATE COMMON
Player 1s Choosing d (%) 20.00 44.19
Player 2s Choosing R (%) 3.33 46.51
# of Pairs 30 43
Game Method
PRIVATE-GAME COMMON-GAME
Player 1s Choosing d (%) 33.33 42.00
Player 2s Choosing R (%) 20.00∗∗ 66.67∗∗∗
# of Pairs 45 50
p-values: ∗ ≤ 0.05, ∗∗ ≤ .01, ∗∗∗ ≤ .001
Table 3: Cooperation Rates by Method
Nash equilibrium has little to do with common knowledge. There is some poetic
justice, then, in the fact that the opportunism of Nash equilibrium does so
well at predicting behavior in this game when we move away from common
information to private information.
Clearly, as we see with such low numbers of Player 1s choosing d in PRIVATE-
GAME, we had good reason to look for data on our comparative hypotheses
using the strategy method. Even though we had good reason, and even though
our main argument and result is independent of this issue, it is an interesting
question whether our observed rates of cooperative play in the trust game are
sensitive to the elicitation method. So we want to compare our data within each
distribution of payoff information (private distributions, common distributions)
across methods (strategy, game).
Some previous comparisons of elicitation method report little difference
in choice behavior for some games (Brandts and Charness, 2000; Cason and
Mui, 1998; Oxoby and McLeish, 2004). Our interest is in the binary-choice
trust game and so the previous research most relevant is Casari and Cason
(2008). They report results on elicitation method from an experiment using a
trimmed-version of the investment game in which Player 1 must make a binary
trust choice to invest all of his endowment or none of it; Player 2 then has the
usual message space for dividing the gains from exchange. They find that Player
1 behavior is invariant across elicitation methods, but that Player 2 behavior
is not — Player 2s display choice behavior significantly less trustworthy when
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those choices are elicited by the strategy method compared to the game method.
We see much the same thing.
The variable of interest here is elicitation method more than information
distribution, so let’s look first at COMMON/COMMON-GAME (Table 3). While
there is no difference between rates of d play by Player 1s across methods,
Player 2s choose R at higher rates in the game method: 46.51% compared to
66.67% (p-value = 0.0098).15
Result (Strategy Method and Strong Reciprocity). Eliciting choices by strategy
method reduces rates at which we observe choices consistent with strong
reciprocity.
We see a somewhat different trend in PRIVATE/PRIVATE-GAME: Player 2s
choices are reciprocal only 3.33% of the time when those choices are elicited by
the strategy method compared to 20% in the game method (p-value = 0.0375).
But this should be treated very cautiously: the difference in rates of R play is
likely just residue from the fact that we have so few observations of Player 2
behavior in PRIVATE-GAME: only 15 Player 1s opt to move d (we have no idea
why they do nor why any Player 2s would then choose R, but 3 of those 15
do). We conjecture that if the sessions were backed by a large enough supply
of funds for subject payment to get a reasonable number of observations at
Player 2s’ decision node (in this case, “large enough” likely means unlimited),
we would see no difference in either Player 1 behavior or in Player 2 behavior
across methods under private distributions of payoff information.
7 Conclusion
We began with a fairly simple question: Given a social preference model, what
information about possible distributions does Player 2 have to have in order
for that model to explain off-equilibrium choice bahvior? Those epistemic
conditions then serve as a way of segregating theories since different classes of
models say that different information about possible distributions is relevant.
That fact alone generates a simple design and set of hypotheses. Our main
result suggests that forms of other-regarding preferences are not empricially
adequate models. That holds quite generally for that entire class of models. Of
course, this result does not confirm any particular strong reciprocity model; it
15This result is further supported by regression analysis, which we have omitted.
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merely says that what we see is compatible with the minimal requirements of
all such models.
It is useful to think of experimental tests as a means of segregating and
falsifying models. But it is also useful to think more abstractly about what the
explanatory force of the classes of models is. If the homo economicus model
explained observed behavior, then that would say something important about
the distribution of types of agents in the population: that the opportunists
exhaust the population. Similarly, if other-regarding preference models re-
ally could explain all that needed explaining, then that would say something
important about the distribution of types of agents in the population: that
the opportunists and altruists exhaust the population. When we interpret our
main result at this level, it thus says something important: opportunists and
altruists — conditional or otherwise — do not exhaust the population; there are
also strong reciprocators in our midst.
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